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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20080351-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
•k & "k * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or application of the Fourth 
Amendment as to the permissible length and scope of detention of passengers in a vehicle 
that police have stopped. See Order, dated July 11, 2008 (attached as Addendum A in 
Petitioner's Brief). 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction or application of the Fourth 
Amendment relating to the circumstances under which search for weapons may be 
conducted. See Order, dated July 11, 2008 (attached as Addendum A in Petitioner's 
Brief). 
'This court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness, with particular 
attention to whether the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
correct standard." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^ 11, 164 P.3d 397. In cases 
involving Fourth Amendment questions under the United States Constitution, we review 
mixed questions of law and fact under a correctness standard in the interest of creating 
uniform legal rules for law enforcement." Id. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
All other controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal stems from the Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Baker, 2008 UT 
App 115, 182 P.3d 935, wherein the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of 
Baker's motion to suppress evidence. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Luke Zachary Baker was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court on or about October 7, 2004, with possession or use of methamphetamine 
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in a drug free zone, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 5 8-3 7-8(2)(a)(i); and unlawful 
possession or use of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §58-37a-5a (R. 1). 
On December 13, 2004, Baker filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting that he was 
illegally searched and seized, violating his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution (R.37-40). 
On February 11, 2005, the trial court denied Baker's motion (R. 68-74; see also 
Addendum B, Petitioner's Brief). 
On January 4, 2006, Baker entered into a conditional "Sery" plea agreement, 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, and to possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor (R. 103-04, 105-12, 113-16). 
On February 22, 2006, Baker was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State prison, prison term suspended, for 
the second degree felony (R. 120). Baker was also sentenced to one year jail, jail term 
suspended, for the misdemeanor (R. 120). Baker was ultimately sentenced to a term of 
90 days in the Utah County jail (R. 120). 
On March 6, 2006, Baker timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment, 
sentence, and commitment in this case in the Fourth District Court (R. 124). The Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, remanding the case 
back to the trial court. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^  19. Subsequently, the State filed 
a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, which this Court granted. 
3 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1 
In the early morning hours of September 30, 2004, Baker was riding in the 
backseat of a car traveling through Pleasant Grove, Utah (R. 149: 5; 150: 24). Pleasant 
Grove Police Officer Raymond Robertson noticed the car's license plate was not 
illuminated (R. 149: 5). Accordingly, he initiated a traffic stop (R. 149: 5). Baker, 2008 
UTApp 115,^2. 
As he approached the vehicle, Officer Robertson noticed a knife in a leather sheath 
on the thigh of a passenger in the back seat (R. 149: 5; 150: 26). At approximately 1:21 
a.m., Officer Robertson ran a warrants check on the driver and discovered that her license 
had been "suspended for drugs" (R. 149: 11, 17-18; 150: 25). Officer Robertson then 
called for a K-9 unit to check the vehicle for controlled substances (R. 149: 12; 150: 25). 
Officer Robertson testified at the preliminary hearing that there was "no other reason" for 
requesting the K-9 unit (R. 149: 11). After he finished talking to dispatch, Officer 
Robertson walked back to the vehicle and proceeded to arrest the driver (R. 149: 12). 
Baker, 2008 UT App 115, If 3. 
Responding to dispatch, additional officers-Pleasant Grove Police Officer Mike 
Bartell and Orem City Police Officer Chris Rockwood—arrived on the scene to assist 
Officer Robertson (R. 150: 9, 15, 19). By the time Officer Bartell arrived, the driver was 
already out of the vehicle and under arrest (R. 149: 5, 12; 150: 9). Officer Robertson 
informed the other officers of the knife, and Officer Bartell proceeded to seize the knife 
Because this court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district 
court," the facts are taken directly from State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, «|fl['s 2-6. 
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while Officer Robertson processed the driver (R. 149: 14; 150: 9). Baker, 2008 UT App 
115?H4. 
Officer Bartell then spoke to the backseat passenger whom Officer Robertson had 
seen with the knife (R. 150: 9). This passenger volunteered that he had a knife sitting on 
his thigh (R. 150: 9). Officer Bartell responded that he "better take the knife until we 
finish up with the stop" (R. 150: 9). Officer Bartell then asked the passengers if there 
were any more knives in the car (R. 150: 9). The passengers, including Baker, then 
handed Officer Bartell approximately twelve other knives, including a set of throwing 
knives (R. 150: 9-10). Officer Bartell testified at the suppression hearing that none of the 
passengers said or did anything to make him fear for his safety once the knives were 
confiscated (R. 150: 13). Officers Rockwood and Robertson concurred with this 
assessment (R. 150: 21-23, 30, 31). Yet Officer Robertson testified at the preliminary 
hearing that the passengers were not free to leave until the K-9 unit arrived (R. 149: 15). 
5afer, 2008 UT App 115,1[5. 
At approximately 1:33 a.m., Officer Robertson placed the driver in the back of his 
patrol car, and at 1:34 a.m., Orem City Police Officer Art Lopez arrived with a police 
service dog (R. 149: 17-18; 150: 5). At this time, Baker and his three remaining riding 
companions were still seated in the vehicle with the engine turned off (R. 150: 5). The 
dog then sniffed around the car and indicated that it smelled drugs (R. 150: 6). 
Accordingly, Officer Rockwood frisked the passengers and found a glass pipe in Baker's 
pants pocket and another in his shoe (R. 150: 15-16, 18). At the suppression hearing, 
Officer Robertson testified that the reason the officers searched Baker was not because 
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they were afraid for their safety, but was instead because they wanted to check for drugs 
and contraband (R. 150: 29, 31-32). Baker was then placed in handcuffs and taken to the 
police station (R. 149: 7). In the process of booking Baker, police officers found a bag 
containing seventy-one grams of methamphetamine (R. 149: 7). Baker, 2008 UT App 
115,H6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State urges this Court to depart from controlling Fourth Amendment 
precedent and adopt a new bright-line rule giving police officers unfettered authority to 
expand and prolong the brief detention of passengers subject to a traffic stop, resulting in 
the passengers being detained until the officers decide that all purposes of the traffic stop 
have been completed, without any showing that the passengers are engaged in criminal 
activity. In this case, the officers stopped the vehicle, arrested the driver, and then 
continued to detain the passengers until the officers decided that the subsequent 
investigation was complete, despite the fact that there was no reasonable articulable 
suspicion that any of the passengers were engaged in criminal activity. The State asserts 
that this new and divergent bright-line rule is necessary for officer safety. 
However, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence already provides police officers the 
authority to control the situation when there is articulable suspicion that a person is 
engaged in criminal activity or is a threat to an officer's safety. Moreover, the State's 
bright-line rule fails to consider personal liberty interests and the right to be free from 
police officers' arbitrary actions. 
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The State further asserts that the Court of Appeals ignored officer safety concerns 
when concluding that the officers should have released Baker after the driver was 
arrested. The State asserts that Baker's prolonged detention was supported by reasonable 
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. However, the State fails to comply with 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate"Procedure by failing to marshal the evidence 
supporting the Court of Appeals' findings. Accordingly, the State's arguments are not 
properly before this Court. In any event, the record is not disputable and the facts show 
that Baker's prolonged detention was not justified by officer safety concerns. 
Ultimately, the State misconstrues the record and the Court of Appeals' decision 
in asserting that the Court of Appeals failed to consider officer safety concerns and 
misapplied Fourth Amendment law. For the reasons stated hereafter, the Court of 
Appeals' decision should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE SEEKS AN ABRUPT CHANGE IN SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE LAW BY URGING THIS COURT TO ALLOW THE 
UNWARRANTED DETENTION OF PASSENGERS WITHOUT 
ANY SHOWING OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
The State urges this Court to abandon controlling Fourth Amendment law and to 
establish a new and divergent bright-line rule authorizing police officers to detain 
passengers during a traffic stop and subsequent investigation, no matter its length, 
without any showing that the passengers are engaged in criminal activity. However, such 
an unprecedented rule fails to balance the constitutional protections of individual liberty 
with officer safety. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence already provides the proper 
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balance since officers routinely and lawfully detain passengers upon an articulable 
showing of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
In reviewing the Court of Appeals' decision, this Court reviews the "decision for 
correctness, with particular attention to whether the court of appeals reviewed the trial 
court's decision under the correct standard." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 11. "In 
cases involving Fourth Amendment questions under the United States Constitution, we 
review mixed questions of law and fact under a correctness standard in the interest of 
creating uniform legal rules for law enforcement." Id. 
The State asserts that the Court of Appeals failed to address its argument that 
officers should be allowed to detain passengers incident to a traffic stop "until all the 
lawful objectives of the stop are completed." Pet. Br. at 12, 13. While the majority in 
Baker may not have addressed the State's argument to its liking, its decision adequately 
addressed controlling Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in finding that Baker's right to 
be free from an unlawful detention was violated. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^  10-
ll .2 
The State asserts that the potential dangers associated with every traffic stop 
outweigh the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable seizures and that a 
new rule is needed to ensure officer safety. Pet. Br. at 12, 16. Such an extreme rule, 
however, is unnecessary as case law already allows police officers to take necessary 
measures to protect themselves as the situation warrants. 
2
 The Court of Appeals rejected the State's assertion "that the K-9 unit search was part 
and parcel of the traffic stop," finding that the driver was arrested before the K-9 unit 
even arrived. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^  12. 
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This Court has outlined "three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement officers and the public: 
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as the 
citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed." 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 
In this case, Baker and the passengers were lawfully seized pursuant to a legal 
traffic stop. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^ J 10. However, while the initial seizure of the 
passengers pursuant to the stop of the driver is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
the purpose of the stop is limited and any detention must be brief and related to the scope 
of the stop. See Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2403 (2007); see also State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ffif 28, 29, 63 P.3d 650, Any further detention must be supported 
by at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. James, 2000 UT 80, \ 
10, 13 P.3d 576; see also State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, f 15, 107 P.3d 706. 
The State acknowledges this fact and quotes in its brief State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1132 (Utah 1994): a "detention [incident to a traffic stop] must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," and the length and 
scope of the stop must be "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." Pet. Br. at 16. 
Thus, if police officers have reasonable articulable suspicion that the passengers 
are engaged in criminal activity, then a further detention of the passengers is justified. 
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However, such investigation and detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary" to effectuate the purpose of the investigation. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. 
In addition, if the police officers reasonably believe that the passengers are armed 
and dangerous, additional steps, such as conducting a Terry frisk, may be reasonable. See 
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, «|J 13, 78 P.3d 590. However, such detentions to frisk for 
weapons are "'a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and should not be taken 
lightly. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)). 
Despite this Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that balances the public interest in 
fighting crime and protecting an individual's right to be free from arbitrary police action, 
the State asserts that police officers should be allowed to always detain passengers once a 
driver has been arrested for as long as it takes the police to complete the subsequent 
investigation of the arrested driver. Pet. Br. at 12, 16. The State relies primarily on 
Brendlin and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), to support this argument. Such 
reliance, however, is misplaced. 
In Brendlin, the United States Supreme Court stated in dicta that "[i]t is also 
reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest or 
investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety." 
Brendlin, 237 S. Ct. at 2407. The Brendlin Court cited to Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15, 
and observed that in Wilson, "we held that during a lawful traffic stop an officer may 
order a passenger out of the car as a precautionary measure, without reasonable suspicion 
that the passenger poses a safety risk." Id. This was so that "the risk of harm to both the 
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police and occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned 
command of the situation." Id. (quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414). 
The State asserts that these United States Supreme Court Cases allow police 
officers, "as a matter of law," to hold and detain innocent passengers until the police 
decide that the stop has concluded. Pet. Br. at 16-17. However, a closer reading of these 
cases shows that the State's argument is misplaced. 
For example, in Wilson, the Court faced the issue of whether passengers could also 
be ordered out of a vehicle during a traffic stop. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410. In Wilson, 
police officers attempted to stop a car for speeding and other traffic violations, but the 
driver refused to stop until traveling another mile and a half. Id. During this time, when 
the driver refused to stop, passengers in the car "turned to look at [the officer] several 
times, repeatedly ducking below site level and then reappearing." Id. Upon stopping the 
car and approaching the driver, "the driver was trembling and appeared extremely 
nervous." Id. One passenger also "appeared extremely nervous." Id. at 410-11. The 
officer ordered the passenger out of the car and then observed a bag of crack cocaine fall 
to the ground. Id. at 411. The passenger was subsequently arrested for possession of 
cocaine. Id. The passenger challenged stop, arguing that the officer ordering him out of 
the vehicle constituted an unreasonable seizure. Id. 
The Wilson Court held that the passenger was reasonably detained. Wilson, 519 
U.S. at 415. In doing so, the Court looked to Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 
(1977) (per curiam), where the Court found that police may, as a matter of course, "order 
the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412 (citing 
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Mimrns, 434 U.S. at 108-09, 111, n.6). The Wilson Court observed that in Mimms, the 
Court balanced the intrusion to the driver's liberty with the officer ordering the driver out 
of the vehicle. Id. (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111). "Noting that the driver's car was 
already validly stopped for a traffic violation, we deemed the additional intrusion of 
asking him to step outside his car was cde minimis.' Accordingly, we concluded that 
'once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers 
may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's 
proscription of unreasonable seizures." Id. (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, n.6). 
Applying Mimms to the facts before it, the Wilson Court observed that the personal 
liberty interest of passengers "is in one sense stronger than that for the driver. There is 
probable cause to believe that the driver has committed an offense, but there is no such 
reason to stop or detain the passengers." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413. But realizing that the 
passengers were already detained by the vehicle stop, the Court observed that the only 
change in circumstance to the passenger by being ordered out of the vehicle "is that they 
will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car." Id. at 414. 
Although the Wilson Court found that "there is not the same basis for ordering the 
passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, the additional intrusion is 
minimal." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15. Thus, after balancing the interests of officer 
safety with the "minimal" intrusion of having a passenger stay in the car versus outside of 
a car during the traffic stop, the Court held such de minimis intrusions are reasonable. Id. 
at 415. 
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Neither Brendlin nor Wilson, however, provide that officers may extend the short 
and minimal intrusion a passenger experiences during a brief traffic stop to a prolonged 
and lengthy detention according to an officer's arbitrary decision to turn the stop of the 
driver into a full-blown investigation of matters not necessarily related to the stop. The 
most Wilson stands for is that "during a lawful traffic stop an officer may order the 
passenger out of the car as a precautionary measure, without reasonable suspicion that the 
passenger poses a safety risk." Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2407 (citing Wilson, 519 U.S. at 
414-15). And all Brendlin holds that passengers are detained for Fourth Amendment 
purposes when the vehicle they are in is stopped by the police. Id. at 2410. 
In fact, Brendlin provides no support to the State's requested bright-line rule. The 
Brendlin Court observed that the "law is well settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a 
traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver 'even though the purpose of the stop is limited 
and the resulting detention quite brief" Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2406 (quoting Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). The Brendlin Court extended this rule to include 
passengers. Id. at 2410. Nothing in Brendlin, however, suggests that officers may 
transform the brief and limited detention to a prolonged detention based on an arbitrary 
decision by a police officer to transform a stop into a full-blown investigation. The de 
minimis intrusions contemplated in both Brendlin and Wilson do not support the State's 
bright-line rule. 
The State's reliance on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and Muehler 
v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), is also misplaced. The State asserts that police officers' 
right to control a traffic stop should be extended to the prolonged detention of passengers 
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even after a driver has been arrested and up until the time police decide to search the 
vehicle. Pet. Br. at 18-19. 
All Summers stands for is that officers may detain "occupants of the premises" 
when executing a valid search warrant founded on probable cause that evidence of a 
crime will be found at that residence. Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05. The Court gave 
many justifications allowing the detention of occupants found at the residence, some of 
which included preventing flight and loss of evidence, officer safety, and an owner's self 
interest in viewing the search and preventing damage to their property. Id. at 702. 
Notably, the Court emphasized the "prime importance in assessing the intrusion [of 
liberty] is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent's house for 
contraband." Id. at 701. Thus, a magistrate, not a police officer, had determined that 
probable cause existed to believe evidence of a crime would be found. Id. at 703. 
Moreover, the Court found that the "detention represents only an incremental intrusion on 
personal liberty when the search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant." Id. 
Mena adds nothing to Summers or to the State's request for a new bright-line rule. 
In Mena, officers executed a search warrant to find "deadly weapons and evidence of 
gang membership." Mena, 544 U.S. at 95-96. During the search of the residence, 
officers found Mena in her bed and placed her in handcuffs and then released her at the 
conclusion of the search. Id. at 96. Relying on Summers, the Court found that the 
detention in handcuffs was reasonable since officers have authority "to detain occupants 
of the premises" when executing a search warrant. Id. at 98 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. 
at 705). 
14 
While Summers and Mena support the rule that occupants of a residence may be 
detained during the execution of a search warrant issued upon probable cause by a 
magistrate, they provide no support to the State's argument that police officers may 
arbitrarily prolong the detention of passengers during a traffic stop beyond the time 
reasonably required to complete the initial purposes of the traffic stop. In fact, none of 
the cases cited by the State supports the argument that the Fourth Amendment allows 
police officers to detain passengers after the initial purposes of the traffic stop are 
complete, when the prolonged detention is based on the arbitrary decision by officers to 
conduct a search of the vehicle incident to arrest of the driver. 
One inherent problem with the State's rule is that it would allow officers the 
unfettered and arbitrary discretion to prolong a stop and even prolong the search incident 
to an arrest of the driver (as what happened in this case) for as long as the officers desire, 
all the while prolonging the detention of passengers with no articulable reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity or officer safety concerns. Such a rule ignores a 
passenger's right to be free from unreasonable seizures and to be free from a police 
officer's arbitrary decision to extend and investigate a traffic stop for as long as the 
officer pleases. The State's bright-line rule turns a de minimis intrusion during a brief 
traffic stop into a significant and serious intrusion of a person's liberty interests, resulting 
in a de facto arrest albeit void of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. Such a 
rule ignores the concerns expressed both in Wilson and Mimms regarding the balancing of 
officer safety with personal security and liberty. 
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While officer safety concerns are important issues with every stop, a passenger's 
personal liberty concerns are also weighty issues that must not be ignored. Officers are 
already afforded broad discretion in prolonging a detention based upon reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity and officers may also conduct Terry frisks based 
on reasonable belief that a passenger is armed and dangerous. If either of these 
circumstances exists during a traffic stop, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows 
officers to take appropriate steps to investigate further and to neutralize any danger. 
However, if no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity is present, and 
officers have no reasonable basis to believe that someone is armed and dangerous, then 
once the officers arrest the driver, or at least the initial purposes of the traffic stop are 
complete, the officers must allow the passengers to proceed on their way. 
Accordingly, the State has failed to show that the Court of Appeals "erred in its 
construction or application of the Fourth Amendment as to the permissible length and 
scope of detention of passengers in a vehicle that police have stopped." Moreover, the 
State ignores an individual's personal liberty interests by urging this Court to adopt a rule 
that allows an arbitrary and prolonged detention of passengers without any showing that 
the passengers are engaged in criminal activity or pose a threat to the officers. Therefore, 
Baker requests that this Court affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
IL THE STATE CHALLENGES THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
FACTUAL FINDINGS YET FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THESE FINDINGS 
Not only does the State request a dramatic change in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the State also attacks the Court of Appeals' decision by asserting that 
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officer safety justified the detention of Baker long after the driver was arrested. Pet. Br. at 
14, 26. Although the State repeatedly challenges the Court of Appeals' factual findings, 
the State fails to marshal the evidence in favor of the Court of Appeal's factual findings 
and also fails to adequately cite to the record in support of its own assertions. 
"[P]arties challenging facts under a clear error standard have a judicially imposed 
obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the challenged finding." State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \ 12. In addition, Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides that "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). This Court has held 
that "[a]t its core, the duty to marshal evidence contemplates that an appellant present 
'every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
appellant resists' and then 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence,' becoming a 'devil's 
advocate.'" In Re E.H., 2006 UT 36, f 64, 137 P.3d 809 (internal citations omitted). 
The State asserts that the officers were justified in detaining the passengers after 
the driver was arrested and then searching the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
while the passengers were still detained due to officer safety concerns. Pet. Br. at 17, 26, 
29-30. In making these assertions, the State challenges the Court of Appeals' factual 
findings without playing the role of devil's advocate by marshaling the evidence 
supporting the Court of Appeals' findings. In any event, the record shows that the facts 
are not disputable and the Court of Appeals made correct findings. 
For example, the State asserts that under the facts of this case, the Court of 
Appeals ignored officer safety concerns which authorized the officers to detain the 
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passengers until all lawful objectives of the stop were completed. Pet. Br. at 17. The 
State supports this assertion by concluding that the Court of Appeals "held that the 
officers should have released the passengers - including returning their knives—before 
undertaking this indisputably lawful objective." Pet. Br. at 17 (original emphasis) (citing 
Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^  19). The State further asserts that the officers "reasonably 
suspected that [Baker] may be armed and dangerous." Pet. Br. at 26. In addition, the 
State asserts that the "detention of defendant beyond the initial purposes of the traffic 
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion," and that the Court of Appeals "second-
guess[ed] the officers as to the timing of the weapons frisk." Pet. Br. at 29-30. The State 
continues by making the wholly unsupported assertion that "the officers reasonably 
deemed it safer to keep passengers under control inside the vehicle while waiting for the 
K-9 unit, rather than attempt to remove and frisk them..." Pet. Br. at 30. 
The State fails to comply with Rule 24 and fails to play devifs advocate by 
marshaling all of the competent evidence in support of the Court of Appeals' factual 
findings. Instead of marshaling the evidence and then showing why the Court of 
Appeals' factual findings were clearly erroneous, the State merely makes numerous 
assertions unsupported by the record. 
Despite the State's assertion otherwise, the Court of Appeals made no finding that 
the officers should have given the passengers back their knives. See Pet. Br. at 17. The 
Court of Appeals merely held that Baker's detention was unreasonable once the driver 
was placed under arrest. Baker, 2008 UT App 115,1} 19. 
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Moreover, the State fails to marshal the evidence in support of the Court of 
Appeals' factual finding that the officers did not believe the passengers were armed and 
dangerous. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, t T s 17-18. Without providing adequate 
citations to the record, the State asserts that the officers reasonably suspected Baker was 
"armed and dangerous." Pet. Br. at 26, 31, 33, 34, 36. The State fails to cite to the record 
to support its assertion that the officers reasonably believed Baker was armed and 
dangerous because there is no support for such an assertion. In fact, the officers 
specifically testified that they were not concerned for their safety (R. 149: 21; 150: 13, 
22-23, 30-32). Thus, the State's assertion that the officers reasonably believed that Baker 
was armed and dangerous and that the Court of Appeals erred in making this finding is 
wholly without merit. 
The State also fails to marshal the evidence in support of the Court of Appeals' 
finding that Baker's detention after the arrest of the driver lacked reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity. See Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^  13. The State asserts that 
the detention beyond the initial purpose of the traffic stop was justified by reasonable 
suspicion and that the officers were justified in choosing to wait to frisk Baker until after 
the drug dog indicated on the vehicle. Pet. Br. at 29-30. But once again, the State fails to 
adequately cite to the record to support this assertion. Pet. Br. at 29-30. The record 
shows that there was no indication that any of the passengers were engaged in criminal 
activity and the State is unable to point to anything contrary. See Baker, 2008 UT App 
115, Tf 13. Moreover, the assertion that the officers intentionally chose, for officer safety 
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reasons, to not initially search the passengers but rather wait to search the passengers 
only after the K-9 search was complete is wholly unsupported by the record. 
In addition, the State asserts that the Court of Appeals found that the driver was 
arrested and the knives were confiscated just one minute before the K-9 arrived. Pet. Br. 
at 31, n. 8. With this statement, the State misreads the actual holding of the Court of 
Appeals and asserts that the driver was not arrested and the knives not recovered until 
just one minute before the K-9 unit arrived. In fact, the Court of Appeals correctly found 
that the driver was arrested just after the K-9 unit was called, anywhere from ten to 
fifteen minutes before the K-9 unit arrived. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^ 3, 12, 26. 
To support its position that the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that 
Baker's detention lacked reasonable articulable suspicion, the State is left with 
misconstruing the Court of Appeals' actual holding as well as the actual record. Mostly, 
the State misreads the record in an attempt to show that the officers were justified in 
detaining Baker because the officers were concerned for their safety. However, the State 
failed to marshal evidence favorable to these assertions because such evidence does not 
exist. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the officers lacked reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Baker or any of the passengers were armed and dangerous. 
Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ^ 18. The Court of Appeals also correctly found that the 
officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that the passengers were engaged in 
criminal activity after the driver's arrest. Id. at f^ 13. 
Accordingly, the State fails to marshal the evidence in support of the Court of 
Appeals' decision and the State fails to adequately cite to the record in support of its own 
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assertions. For these reasons, this Court can ignore the State's assertions for failing to 
comply with Rule 24. In any event, the State's assertions are contrary to the record and 
should be disregarded. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RELATING TO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH SEARCHES FOR WEAPONS 
MAY BE CONDUCTED 
The State asserts that the Court of Appeals' decision "forces police officers into a 
Catch 22: they can choose to protect themselves and risk suppression of any contraband 
they discovery during a weapons frisk, or they can choose not to protect themselves and 
risk attack by armed detainees." Pet. Br. at 39-40. Under the indisputable facts of this 
case, the State's argument is absurd and without merit. 
The State cites to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) for the well established rule 
that a weapons frisk may not be conducted absent individual suspicion that a detainee is 
both armed and dangerous. Pet. Br. at 33. Moreover, "If a protective search goes beyond 
what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry 
and its fruits will be suppressed." Baker, 2008 UT App 115. ^  15 (quoting State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, <[ 13, (internal citations omitted)). 
The State asserts only that the Court of Appeals misapplied the Terry doctrine 
because it erred in finding that the officers did not reasonably believe that "defendant 
may be armed and dangerous and the weapons frisk of his person was therefore 
justified." Pet. Br. at 33-34. 
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Not only does the State fail to marshal evidence supporting the Court of Appeals' 
findings to the contrary, as discussed in point II, the State misconstrues and/or ignores the 
facts in this case. The State cogently points out that "[j]u s t because defendant and the 
other passengers had relinquished some knives," it was not mandatory for the officers to 
believe that the passengers had handed over all of the knives. Pet. Br. at 35. This is true. 
Conveniently, the State leaves out the fact that the officers themselves testified that they 
were not concerned for their safety (R. 150: 13, 22-23, 30-32). Moreover, despite ample 
opportunity to testify otherwise, no officer testified that after the knives were voluntarily 
handed over, they believed Baker or any of the passengers were armed or dangerous/ 
The State next asserts that the fact that thirteen knives were confiscated gives rise 
to objective reasonable suspicion that in these circumstances, the passengers were armed 
and dangerous. Pet. Br. at 36. However, the State fails to review the totality of 
circumstances regarding the entire incident and the retrieval of the knives. Moreover, the 
State fails to properly and adequately refute the Court of Appeals' finding that "in this 
particular situation, the mere presence of the knives, which had been confiscated at the 
time the officers decided to search the passengers, is not a specific and articulable fact 
which taken together with other rational inferences from that fact, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous." 
Baker, 2008 UT App 115, U 17 (original emphasis) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
Officer Robertson testified at both the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing 
(R. 150: 24). All three officers were repeatedly asked about concerns for officer safety 
(R. 150: 13,22-23,30-32). 
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Contrary to the State's assertion otherwise, the facts in this particular case that the 
officers confiscated thirteen knives is not sufficient evidence to find that the officers 
believed that the passengers were armed and dangerous. It is not necessarily the number 
of passengers or the number of knives found that makes officers reasonably believe a 
person is armed and dangerous. Courts have wisely not attempted to make an all-
inclusive list of what facts provide reasonable belief that a person is armed and 
dangerous. Rather, the requirement is that officers must be able to articulate specific 
facts combined with rational inferences therefrom which supports the reasonable belief 
that a person is armed and dangerous. See Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 29. 
The officers in this case were unable to point out any articulable facts suggesting 
that the passengers were armed and dangerous. In fact, none of the officers testified that 
they believed that the passengers were armed or dangerous (R. 150: 13, 22-23, 30-32). 
The State's assertions otherwise that the officers objectively believed that the passengers 
were both armed and dangerous lacks merit. 
In a final effort to show that the officers should have been concerned for their 
safety, the State asserts that the mere fact that the K-9 unit alerted on a door handle 
provided the officers reasonable belief that the passengers were both armed and 
dangerous. Pet. Br. at 37. However, the K-9 indication on the vehicle occurred only 
after Baker had already been illegally detained, as the Court of Appeals correctly found. 
See Baker, 2008 UT App 115,112. Moreover, even though the K-9 indicated on the 
vehicle, none of the officers testified that once they K-9 indicated on the vehicle they 
then believed that the passengers were now armed and dangerous. The State's references 
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to case law showing that drug-dog alerts may provide evidence that a person is armed and 
dangerous is not relevant here since there was no testimony or evidence that the officers 
believed that the passengers were both armed and dangerous. 
There simply is no evidence to support a finding that the officers objectively 
believed that Baker was both armed and dangerous and that the officers were justified in 
frisking him for weapons. 
While the State alludes to looking at the "totality of the circumstances" in 
determining whether the search of Baker was justified, the State, in all actuality, asks this 
Court to consider each fact in isolation, as it appears on a black and white sheet of paper, 
ignore the officer's sworn testimony, and then conclude that any objective officer 
participating in this traffic stop would believe that Baker and the other passengers were 
armed and dangerous, and out of concern for officer safety, the officers were justified in 
detaining the passengers in the vehicle until the K-9 could come and search the vehicle, 
and after the K-9 indicated on the vehicle, the officers were justified in searching Baker 
for weapons. 
In making this argument, not only does the State ignore the indisputable factual 
record, the State also ignores the twenty seven and one-half years of combined police 
experience by the three officers initially on the scene as well as their plain and explicit 
testimony that they did not consider the passengers a threat to their safety (R. 149:5, 21; 
150:8, 13, 14,21,22-23,30-32). 
If the officers believed that Baker or the other passengers were armed and 
dangerous, they would have so testified. This lack of testimony, however, shows that the 
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Court of Appeals correctly found that the officers did not believe that Baker was armed 
and dangerous. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the relevant case 
law in finding that the frisk violated Baker's constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Baker asks this" Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' 
decision. Baker further asks that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court 
with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn, that all evidence obtained as a result of 
the illegal search and seizure be suppressed, and that the matter is to be dismissed. 
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